Five studies indicate that conceptualizations of power are important elements of culture and serve culturally relevant goals. These studies provide converging evidence that cultures nurture different views of what is desirable and meaningful to do with power. Vertical individualism is associated with a conceptualization of power in personalized terms (i.e., power is for advancing one's personal status and prestige), whereas horizontal collectivism is associated with a conceptualization of power in socialized terms (i.e., power is for benefiting and helping others). Cultural variables are shown to predict beliefs about appropriate uses of power, episodic memories about power, attitudes in the service of power goals, and the contexts and ways in which power is used and defended. Evidence for the cultural patterning of power concepts is observed at both the individual level and the cultural-group level of analysis.
Power is a basic force in social relationships (S. T. Fiske, 1993) . Our perception about powerful people frequently links them to selfish actions aimed at advancing personal goals, needs, and ideas (see Kipnis, 1976) , as reflected in Machiavelli's passage. However, although we often fail to consider this, power can also be exercised in socially responsible ways, attending and responding to the needs of others. What is the relation between culture and one's concepts of power? In this research, we address this question by studying culturally nurtured views about the meaning and purpose of power, as manifested in beliefs, attitudes, and goals related to power.
We propose that culturally nurtured views about power can vary significantly. As one example, Americans seem obsessed with powerful celebrities (think Donald Trump) who have made it to the top mainly due to craven self-interest and who use their power to selfaggrandize. This contrasts with the more benevolent way of conceptualizing power in most of Latin America, where powerful political leaders (or caudillos) are frequently idealized as benefactors whose primary goal is to protect helpless individuals (Auyero, 2001; Taylor, 2004) . We argue that self-centered versus benevolent conceptualizations of power emerge from culturally nurtured beliefs, attitudes, and goals; that is, from one's cultural orientation (Triandis, 1996) . However, as central as power is in human affairs, cultural theorizing has yet to recognize such distinct power concepts.
We begin, on the basis of the power literature, by dimensionalizing the concepts of interest. Then we show how they can be linked to a relatively new distinction in the study of culture between vertical and horizontal versions of individualism and collectivism. Five studies are presented to demonstrate that this distinction tracks cultural differences in self-centered and benevolent views of power, as manifested broadly in beliefs, judgments, and behaviors relevant to power. The findings contribute to the study of culture by elucidating the sociocognitive and behavioral correlates of vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism. Moreover, they contribute to the study of power by demonstrating for the first time the cultural antecedents of distinct power concepts.
Power: Two Alternative Conceptualizations
We define power as "an individual's relative capacity to modify others' states by providing or withholding resources or adminis-tering punishments" (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003, p. 265) . The unrestricted ability of power holders to act without social interference often results in a self-centered conceptualization of power for promoting one's own ideas and goals (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Goodwin, Operario, & Fiske, 1998) . According to this well-supported view of power, power holders often act with their self-interests at heart and pay little attention to the views and needs of others (S. T. Fiske, 1993) . Over time, then, power may have a corrosive and destructive effect on the power holder (Kipnis, 1976) .
However, recent research has suggested that power holders can also behave in a more benevolent or attentive way, showing concern about others' interests or attending to them as individuals (e.g., Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Howard, Gardner, & Thompson, 2007; Overbeck & Park, 2001 ). For instance, Chen et al. (2001) found that when power was primed, people with communal and exchange relationship orientations (Clark & Mills, 1979) behaved differently. Exchange-oriented people, or those disposed to give a benefit to a partner with the expectation of receiving comparable benefits in return, behaved according to common expectations about power holders; that is, they benefited themselves over others. In contrast, communal-oriented people, or those disposed to respond to the needs and interests of others, behaved in ways aimed at benefiting others over themselves. Similarly, Howard et al., (2007) showed that powerful individuals with either a chronic or a temporarily salient independent (interdependent) self-construal can be less (more) generous in resolving their disputes with low-powered opponents.
We argue that the differences just mentioned can emerge from culturally nurtured views about the meaning and purpose of power. Power is instrumental for achieving culturally nurtured goals. Because those goals differ by culture, the views of power as a tool for achieving culturally specific goals should differ as well. Accordingly, some cultures foster a conceptualization of power as something to be used for advancing one's personal agenda, and hence maintaining and promoting one's powerful status, whereas others foster a concept of power as something to be used for benefiting others.
We propose that considering the distinction in the power literature between personalized and socialized power motives (McClelland, 1973; McClelland, Wanner, & Vanneman, 1972; McClelland & Wilsnack, 1972) can be used to address these alternative, culturally nurtured power concepts. People with a strong personalized power motive strive for self-centered goals of influencing and being praised by others to advance their status (McClelland, 1987; Winter, 1973 Winter, , 1993a . These goals are often attained by engaging in forceful actions, influence attempts, and behaviors aimed at impressing and signaling power and status to undifferentiated audiences. In contrast, people with a strong socialized power motive pursue prosocial goals for the benefit of some other person or cause and avoid negative effects on others (Winter, 1973) . These goals are often attained by joining service organizations or directly providing unsolicited help to others (McClelland, 1973; Winter, 1973) . Next, we consider how these alternative power concepts emerge from beliefs, attitudes, and goals nurtured by one's cultural orientation.
Power and Culture
Because of the centrality and instrumentality of power for achieving culturally nurtured goals, cultures foster normative standards for the legitimate use of power (Chiu & Hong, 2006) . Surprisingly, cultural frameworks have had little to say about how culture nurtures views about the meaning and purpose of power. Instead, the emphasis has been on cultural patterns of inequality in the distribution of power. This notion was originally captured by Hofstede (1980 Hofstede ( , 2001 under the label power distance. In his seminal work, based on a large survey of IBM employees located in 50 countries, Hofstede defined power distance as the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a culture expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. Power distance characterizes social systems and national cultures, rather than individuals, indexing shared cultural acceptance of the role of social hierarchy, particularly in work contexts. However, it does not directly address either cultural differences or individual differences in the nature of power concepts. High power distance is often referenced to explain the behavior of power holders who act with little concern for the welfare of others (e.g., attitudes toward collective violence, Paez et al., 2008;  or sexual harassment, Wasti & Cortina, 2002) . The implied definition of power here is a personalized one.
At the individual level, power has been addressed via Shalom Schwartz's foundational studies of value structures (e.g., Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987 , 1990 . In this framework, personal values regarding power are defined with reference to having either social status and prestige or the authority to tell others what to do (Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987 , 1990 . Power values are measured through ratings of the importance of "authority" and "wealth" as guiding principles in people's lives-in other words, agreement with statements such as "It is important to me to be rich. I want to have a lot of money and expensive things" and "It is important to me to get respect from others. I want people to do as I say" (Davidov, Schmidt, & Schwartz, 2008) . Moreover, power values are seen as manifested in such behaviors as "pressing others to go along with one's preferences and opinions" or "choosing friends based on how much money they have" (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003) . The relationship of these descriptions with notions of authoritarianism and the endorsement of a right-wing ideology (Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2006) suggest they are a good fit to a self-centered power concept but do not necessarily capture the pursuit of power goals for the benefit of others. Indeed, in Schwartz's circumplex model of value structure, concerns with the welfare of close others (i.e., benevolence values) or of people in general (universalism) are conceived as being in psychological conflict with concerns about acquiring power and achieving status (Schwartz, 1992) .
This specific definition of power complicates the study of culturally nurtured standards regarding power. This makes it difficult to recognize that some cultures may promote the use of power for the benefit of others rather than for achieving status and prestige. If power is defined solely in personalized terms (status, personal prestige), then cultural differences in power concepts cannot be observed. Yet, we expect such cultural differences to manifest themselves in beliefs about how power should be distributed and used in the culture, attitudes toward objects that symbolize power concepts, and goals that people strive for regarding power.
Although predictions about systematic differences in culturally nurtured views of power have never been tested empirically, Winter (1993a) suggested that cultures may differ in what is defined as power and the paths used to attain power. Analysis of folktales suggests that cultures vary not only in terms of the prevalence of power themes for communicating widely shared cultural values but also in the nature of associations with power that are used to communicate and reinforce these values (e.g., displays of success vs. supporting others; McClelland, Davis, Wanner, & Kalin, 1972; Wanner, 1972) . In this manner, power themes and goals become linked to widely shared cultural values. Thus, Whiting and colleagues (Whiting & Edwards, 1973; Whiting & Whiting, 1975) argued that, in certain cultures, children seem to develop self-centered types of power goals associated with aggression and dominance (i.e., similar to personalized power), whereas in other cultures they develop nurturant types of power goals associated with helping others (i.e., similar to socialized power).
The Role of Horizontal and Vertical Cultural Orientations
The most widely used cross-cultural distinction contrasts individualism and collectivism (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1995) . Individualism and collectivism relate to self-definitions that emphasize personal versus collective aspects and relate to the relative emphasis on personal goals versus ingroup goals. Although the individualism/collectivism classification does not directly address power concepts and goals, we propose that the distinction between vertical and horizontal cultural orientations (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995; Triandis, 1995; Triandis, Chen, & Chan, 1998; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) can be used to identify and predict the distinct culturally nurtured frames of reference regarding power.
Triandis and colleagues have suggested that the vertical/ horizontal distinction intersects with the broadly used classification of individualism and collectivism to delineate four distinct and independent cultural orientations (see Singelis et al., 1995; Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) . This four-category typology fits well with A. P. Fiske's (1992) four elementary forms of sociality that underlie most kinds of social interaction, evaluation, and affect (see Triandis, 1995; also Triandis & Gelfand, 1998 , for a discussion about the origins of these orientations). In vertical individualist (VI) societies (e.g., the United States), people strive to become distinguished and acquire status via competition. In horizontal individualist (HI) cultural contexts (e.g., Sweden), people value uniqueness but are not especially interested in becoming distinguished and achieving high status. In horizontal collectivist (HC) cultural contexts (e.g., the Israeli kibbutz), people emphasize common goals with others, interdependence and responsibility for others, and sociability, but they do not submit to authority. Finally, in vertical collectivist (VC) societies (e.g., Japan), people subordinate their goals to those of their ingroups, submit to the will of authority, and support competition of their ingroups with outgroups.
The vertical/horizontal distinction addresses the nature and importance of hierarchy in interpersonal relations (Singelis et al., 1995; Triandis, 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) . Although this distinction does not explicitly identify culturally nurtured views about power, it addresses views of the self in relation to others that may track the distinct power concepts of interest. By examining the vertical/horizontal distinction, we argue, one can distinguish between self-definitions that emphasize acquiring status in individual competitions with others and those that emphasize the pursuit of common goals. As we describe presently, individuals with a vertical orientation emphasize status enhancement (i.e., a personalized concept of power). In contrast, some individuals with a horizontal orientation exhibit a focus on interpersonal support and common goals that may nurture a socialized power concept. Thus, vertical and horizontal cultural orientations offer the opportunity to link cultural variables with distinct power concepts.
Specifically, one would expect VI (and not HI) to be associated with a personalized concept of power. VI is associated with concerns about achieving status in individual competitions with others (as captured by scale items such as "Winning is everything"; Singelis et al., 1995; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998 , full scale items in Appendix). People high in VI (vs. HI) orientation give more importance to displays of success and status (Nelson & Shavitt, 2002) . Moreover, a number of studies (e.g., Oishi, Schimmack, Diener, & Suh, 1998; Soh & Leong, 2002) have indicated that a VI cultural orientation predicts the endorsement of power values of social prestige and control over people and resources (Schwartz, 1992) , reflective of a personalized power concept, whereas an HI orientation predicts endorsement of self-direction values of independent thought and choice (Schwartz, 1992) .
For high-VI individuals, the primary meaning and purpose of power is to achieve status and recognition (i.e., a personalized power concept). Frequent activation of personalized power concepts for people high in VI should result in strong mental associations between power and those beliefs and goals that are instrumental for achieving status and recognition. Furthermore, given their self-centered conceptualization of power, high-VI individuals should be unlikely to view helping others as a meaningful purpose of power. In contrast, HI individuals are less concerned about either achieving status or helping others and instead focus more on self-direction (as captured by scale items such as "I'd rather depend on myself than others"). Displays of success associated with the pursuit of personalized power goals are strongly discouraged in HI cultural contexts (Nelson & Shavitt, 2002) . Because power is not a fundamental issue for high HI individuals, their infrequent use of power concepts should result in relatively weak associations in memory between power and either self-centered goals or benevolent goals. In summary, a VI orientation should be associated with having a personalized power concept and unrelated to having a socialized power concept. An HI orientation should not predict either personalized or socialized power concepts.
We further predict that HC is associated with a socialized power concept. People high in HC emphasize nurturing and interdependent relationships with others (Triandis, 1995) . These individuals focus their social relationships on important ingroups and similar others in general (as captured by scale items such as "I feel good when I cooperate with others"). An HC cultural orientation is positively correlated with the endorsement of benevolence values and negatively correlated with personalized power values of control or dominance over people and resources (Oishi et al., 1998) . This emphasis on cooperating with and helping others, as opposed to being submissive toward or wanting to dominate others, is characteristic of individuals with a socialized power concept (Frieze & Boneva, 2001; McClelland, 1973) .
For high-HC individuals, the meaning and purpose of power should be to help others (i.e., a socialized power concept). Con-tinued activation of a socialized power concept should result in people high in HC orientation forming strong mental associations between power and those beliefs and goals that are instrumental for helping others. High-HC individuals may consider it inappropriate to use power for personal gain without considering others' concerns. This is consistent with findings suggesting that individuals high in HC orientation can stand against authoritarian aggression (Kemmelmeier et al., 2003) and do not easily submit to authority (Triandis, 1995) . In summary, an HC orientation should be positively associated with having a socialized power concept and negatively associated with using power solely in personalized terms.
Individuals high in VC orientation will have more complex conceptualizations of power. They sometimes view power in personalized terms (Singelis et al., 1995) . Indeed, a VC orientation can predict high levels of prejudice and hostile treatment of outgroups (Triandis, 1995) . However, high-VC individuals sacrifice personal goals for the sake of ingroup goals (as captured by scale items such as "It is my duty to take care of my family, even when I have to sacrifice what I want"; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) , suggesting that they also have a concept of socialized power. This duality should particularly characterize high-status VC individuals, for whom power may be simultaneously associated with prosocial goals of helping ingroups and with selfish goals of winning out over outgroups. In contrast, low-status VC individuals do not shoulder the same responsibilities in the social hierarchy. Because, for people high in VC, power associations may depend on their place in the hierarchy and on other contextual factors, specific predictions about their power associations are outside the scope of this research.
The Present Studies
Five studies were conducted to show that individuals high in VI (HC) orientation conceptualize power in personalized (socialized) terms. To uncover culturally nurtured differences in what is desirable and meaningful to do with power, we studied manifestations of personalized or socialized power concepts in the beliefs, attitudes, and goals linked to one's cultural orientation (see Triandis, 1996) . Evidence for a culturally patterned view of power was provided by investigating beliefs about appropriate uses of power, episodic memories about power, attitudes in the service of power goals, and the contexts and ways in which power is used. The studies used multicultural samples and measured cultural orientation, which allowed for simultaneously testing hypotheses at both the individual and cultural-group level of analysis. Although past research has extensively addressed cultural groups known to differ along the broadly defined individualism/collectivism distinction (e.g., Hofstede, 1980) , much less is known about cultural groups that can be classified into the more specific categories addressing the vertical/horizontal distinction. For instance, it is not clear whether groups commonly viewed as collectivists (e.g., Chinese or Asian Americans) better fit a horizontal or vertical orientation. For this reason, our studies included groups commonly used in crosscultural research (e.g., European Americans and East Asians) as well as underresearched groups (Hispanic immigrants, students in Brazil and Norway). This broad sampling increases the potential coverage of vertical and horizontal cultures and allows for generalizing findings across a broader range of cultures.
We used cultural orientation and ethnic or national group as alternative operationalizations of culture (see Chiu & Hong, 2006; Lalwani, Shavitt, & Johnson, 2006; Lalwani, Shrum, & Chiu, 2009 ) and simultaneously analyzed their independent effects on power representations. Because group and psychological levels of analysis do not necessarily yield consistent relationships (e.g., Bond, 2002; Gaines et al., 1997; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Triandis, 1995) and can contribute independently to explaining psychological phenomena (Lalwani et al., 2006) , these analyses allowed us to examine the simultaneous and distinct effects of these cultural variables.
The first two studies investigated (a) beliefs about the appropriateness of using power in personalized or socialized terms and (b) episodic memories about power. Study 1 used core measures of personalized and socialized power concepts in the literature to examine whether a VI (HC) orientation is associated with endorsing the use of power in the service of self-focused (prosocial) goals. Study 2 analyzed episodic recall for events associated with exercises of personalized and socialized power. We expected more vivid recall of events associated with the pursuit of culturally relevant power goals. Study 3 investigated attitudes in the service of power goals by assessing people's liking for brands that embody personalized or socialized power. If cultural orientation is linked to views about desirable, power-related end states, then one would expect product evaluations that are congruent with these culturally emphasized power goals. The last two studies analyzed the contexts and ways in which people use power. Study 4 investigated responses in contexts that made salient personalized or socialized power objectives. We expected responses that promote the attainment of culturally relevant power objectives (e.g., intentions to help others for high-HC people and intentions to respond aggressively to status threats for high-VI people). Finally, using an unobtrusive measure of behavior, Study 5 uncovered tendencies among those with an HC (VI) orientation to use power in a more benevolent (exploitative) way.
Study 1: Culture and Beliefs About Exercises of Power
Study 1 was designed to assess whether those with a VI cultural orientation endorse a more self-centered view of power in the service of self-focused goals, whereas those with an HC cultural orientation endorse a more benevolent view of power for the benefit of others. We tapped into these two distinct types of power-related beliefs using three power-motivation measures validated in the literature. Personalized power beliefs and behaviors were measured with the Misuse of Power (MOP) scale (Lee-Chai, Chen, & Chartrand, 2001 ) and the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) scale (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) . Socialized power beliefs were measured with the Helping Power Motivation (HPM) scale (Frieze & Boneva, 2001) . The study employed a multicultural sample and controlled for cultural-group membership. We sampled, in addition to European Americans and East Asians, Hispanic participants, a collectivist group known for adopting the communal relationships associated with an HC orientation (e.g., Penaloza, 1994) . The inclusion of groups likely to vary significantly in their mean HC and VI scores increases the chances of uncovering group-level differences in power concepts and of demonstrating that relations generalize across cultures. The sample used here should also facilitate assessing whether group-level differences in power associations are mediated by individual cultural-orientation scores.
The MOP scale captures people's beliefs about the desirability and appropriateness of exercising power in the service of one's personal agenda. It speaks directly to interpersonal situations in which an individual has the power to influence or use others. Some of the items reflect a blatant disregard for the consequences of one's powerful behavior on others (e.g., sometimes it's okay to take credit for one's staff members' ideas, because later they'll do the same thing). If a VI orientation is associated with beliefs and behaviors that support a personalized view of power, then one would expect MOP scores to correlate positively with a VI orientation. In addition, because some MOP items reflect a use of personalized power without regard for others, we anticipated an HC orientation to correlate negatively with MOP scores.
The SDO scale focuses on beliefs in the inequality of social groups (e.g., "Some people are just more worthy than others"; Pratto et al., 1994) , and people high in social dominance orientation tend to endorse ideologies that support societal inequalities (e.g., Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1993) . A belief in the validity of hierarchies at the societal level is conceptually distinct from personal status seeking. However, social dominance orientation is associated with the desire by high-status people to maintain their status by dominating others. Given that SDO and MOP scores tend to be correlated (in the order of .63; Lee-Chai et al., 2001) , people high in social dominance orientation should be more likely to misuse power for their own benefit. We thus expected SDO scores to correlate positively with a VI orientation and negatively with an HC orientation. Evidence using an older version of the cultural-orientation scale (Triandis, 1995) points to this (Strunk & Chang, 1999) . Using a refined cultural-orientation scale (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) and examining the unique variance accounted for by each cultural orientation, we expected a positive relation between social dominance orientation and VI, and a negative relation between social dominance orientation and HC.
The HPM scale taps beliefs about the desirability and appropriateness of exercising power for the benefit of others. It measures attitudes and helping tendencies rooted in people's strivings for socialized power (e.g., it would feel great to have a good influence on someone's life) and speaks directly to interpersonal situations in which an individual has the power to have positive effects on others (e.g., it would be really fulfilling to be a teacher who can motivate students; or if someone needs help, I make an effort to help them). If an HC orientation is associated with beliefs and behaviors that support a socialized view of power, then HPM scores should correlate positively with an HC orientation. In addition, given that high-VI individuals should not consider helping others as a meaningful purpose of power, we expected HPM to be uncorrelated with a VI orientation.
Method
Participants. Participants were 419 people from four cultural groups: 174 European American and 99 East Asian/Asian American students from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 1 (on average, East Asian students had been in the United States for 6.7 years), 75 business students from Singapore Management University, and 71 Hispanic immigrants (82% from Mexico, with an average of 10.4 years in the United States) residing in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area. Sixty percent of participants were male. Average age of student participants was 21.0 years and of Hispanic participants was 37.4. Students in the United States participated for course credit, whereas Singaporean students and Hispanics were paid $10 and $8, respectively, for their participation. Hispanic participants were recruited through organizations with links to this population (e.g., churches).
Procedure. In groups of 20 -30, and as part of a longer survey about people's opinions about varied topics, products, and brands, participants completed the 18-item MOP scale, the 21-item HPM scale, and the 14-item SDO scale (due to an error in administration, only 274 participants completed the SDO scale). After working on some unrelated tasks for 15 min, they filled in the 16-item cultural-orientation scale (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) measuring HI, VI, HC, and VC. Then they answered demographic questions and were debriefed and dismissed. Participants in the United States and Singapore completed materials in English. Hispanic participants did so in Spanish.
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Results
Scale structures and reliabilities. We assessed the structure of the cultural-orientation scale using a multigroup confirmatory factor analysis with four intercorrelated factors (one for each cultural-orientation subscale). For each cultural group, factor loadings were all positive and statistically significant (test statistics averaged 7.64 for European Americans, 5.44 for Hispanics, 3.63 for East Asians/Asian Americans, and 3.76 for Singaporeans; all ps Ͻ .05). Standardized factor loadings were generally large (in excess of .50 in 94% of the cases).
3 Scale reliabilities for culturalorientation subscales and power measures were satisfactory in all samples (see Table 1 ).
Power-related beliefs by cultural groups. There was no evidence from the debriefing that participants saw a link between their ethnicity and responses to the measures. Group differences in power-related beliefs were assessed via a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with the means of the MOP, SDO, and HPM scores as dependent variables, cultural group as a fixed factor, and participants' age as a covariate. As expected, there were significant differences between groups on the MOP, F(3, 267) ϭ 12.73, p Ͻ .001; the SDO, F(3, 267) ϭ 11.15, p Ͻ .001; and the HPM, F(3, 267) ϭ 5.15, p Ͻ .005. There were no effects of participant age (all ps Ͼ .2). As shown in Table 1 , Hispanic participants scored significantly lower on the MOP and the SDO than did any of the other groups. In contrast, they scored higher on the HPM than did any of the other groups. Corresponding with this, Hispanic participants, as a group, also had the highest HC and the lowest VI scores compared with all other groups. There were no differences 1 In these and subsequent studies, because no significant differences emerged for any of the measures between East Asian and Asian American participants tested at the University of Illinois, data for these two groups were combined to increase the power of the test. Analyses conducted separately on the samples showed the same patterns of results.
2 In this and subsequent studies, instruments were translated to the local language using standard translation-back translation procedures (Brislin, 1970) . 3 Subsequent studies yielded similar structural properties of the cultural orientation subscales across the different samples of participants.
between European Americans and East Asians/Asian Americans in any of the power measures or in their HC and VI scores. The two groups differed only in VC scores (East Asians/Asian Americans scored significantly higher). This is consistent with some past findings (e.g., Benet-Martinez & Karakitapoglu-Aygun, 2003) and may be attributed to the fact that Asian participants completed the orientation measure in English (Trafimow, Silverman, Fan, & Law, 1997) . Singaporeans also scored higher than European Americans did in VC and VI scores and on the SDO. This is consistent with Triandis and Gelfand's (1998, Study 4) findings that a VC orientation correlates with right-wing authoritarianism.
Overall, these findings suggest that between-group differences in power-related beliefs followed the pattern of their VI and HC orientation scores, although some groups' orientation scores did not differ as proposed. Given that cultural-group and individual levels of analysis often do not yield isomorphic results (Oyserman et al., 2002) , deeper insights can be gained by simultaneously analyzing the independent effect of cultural orientation and group membership on the power measures.
Power-related beliefs as a function of cultural orientation and group. To examine the simultaneous effect of cultural orientation and cultural-group membership on power beliefs, we estimated three separate compositional multilevel models (one for each power measure) in which participants (Level 1) are nested within the four different cultural groups (Level 2). These models estimate the effect of the predictor (i.e., cultural orientation) on power beliefs at the two different levels of the hierarchy (see Chan, 1998 ; also Enders & Tofighi, 2007 , for details on these models). This allowed us to assess whether group-level cultural-orientation scores predict power beliefs over and above individual-level cultural-orientation scores. The models decomposed the culturalorientation predictors (HC or VI depending on the model) into a within-level and a between-level component by using the culturalgroup means, HC j and VI j , as predictors in the Level 2 intercept equations. Following accepted practices using these models, the predictors were group-mean-centered for the analysis (Enders & Tofighi, 2007; Hofmann & Gavin, 1998) . The full models are described next.
MOP and SDO scores are predicted by the following regression equation:
where Y ij is the MOP or SDO score (two separate models) for participant i in cultural group j (j ϭ 1, 2, 3, or 4); HI ij , VI ij , HC ij , and VC ij are the cultural-orientation scores of the same participant; age ij is the age of the same participant; VI j is the mean VI score of all participants in cultural group j; and r ij is the Level 1 residual. The term ␥ 00 ϩ (␥ 01 )VI j ϩ u 0j is the intercept for cultural group j and is composed of a mean intercept (␥ 00 ), the effect of the cultural-group mean VI score on the dependent variable (␥ 01 ) at Level 2; and a random component (u 0j ) that captures group j's deviation from the mean. The coefficients ␥ 10 , ␥ 20 , ␥ 30 , ␥ 40, and ␥ 50 represent the slope of the linear relationship, at Level 1, between the dependent variable and HI, VI, HC, VC, and age, respectively. Finally, the random component u 2j represents group j's deviation from the mean slope of the linear relationship between VI and the dependent variable. This assesses cultural-group differences in slopes, which addresses generalizability of the hypothesized relationships. HPM scores are predicted by the following corresponding equation in which HC terms replace VI terms:
Substantively, our interest lies in the slope coefficients ␥ 20 and ␥ 30 , which reflect the hypothesized linear relationships between power beliefs and individual VI and HC scores. We were also interested in the slope coefficients of the relationships between power beliefs and group-level mean VI and HC scores (␥ 01 ), which reflect the contextual effect of cultural-group scores on individual power beliefs. Finally, we evaluated deviations of the group-level slopes from the mean slope (u 2 and u 3 ) to assess the generalizability of the relationships across cultures. For each of the three models, all the parameters were estimated using the HLM 6.02 software provided by Raudenbush and Bryk (2002). 4 Relationships between power beliefs and cultural orientations. The estimated coefficients for each of the three models are in Table 2 . The slope coefficient of the linear relationship between individual MOP and VI scores (␥ 20 ) was positive and significant, as was the case for SDO scores. This suggests, as predicted, that a VI orientation is positively associated with beliefs about the appropriateness of using power for one's own benefit and the en- dorsement of ideologies that promote the domination of others. In contrast, the slope coefficient of the linear relationship between individual MOP and HC scores (␥ 30 ) was negative and significant, as was the case for SDO scores, suggesting that individuals high in HC orientation oppose exercising power without concern for others. On the other hand, slope coefficients for the linear relationships between HI and VC scores and the power measures were not significant, attesting to the discriminant validity of the four cultural-orientation subscales for predicting personalized power beliefs.
For helping-power motivation, the HC slope coefficient was large and significant. The VC slope coefficient was also significant but smaller in size than that of the HC ( p Ͻ .01). This suggests that the higher one's HC (and to a lesser extent one's VC) orientation, the more one believes that it is desirable and meaningful to use power for helping others. As expected, there was no relationship between VI or HI orientations and motivation to help others.
Generalizability of relationships between power and cultural orientation. To assess generalizability of the relationships between cultural orientation and power beliefs across cultural groups, we analyzed deviations of the group-level slopes from the mean slope (u 2 and u 3 random components). These random components were not significantly different from zero for misuse of power and VI (u 2 ) or for social-dominance orientation and VI. Similarly, the random component for helping-power motivation and HC (u 3 ) did not differ from zero. These findings support the generalizability of the findings across cultural groups (see group-level slopes in Table 3 ).
Group-level cultural-orientation scores and power beliefs. The contextual effect of high-HC and -VI group-level scores (i.e., cultural contexts high in VI and HC) on individual power beliefs can be inferred from the size of the ␥ 01 coefficients. As shown in Table 2 , the slope coefficient of the linear relationship between group-level VI scores and individual power beliefs was positive and significant for social-dominance orientation-significantly different from that obtained at the individual level, 2 (2) ϭ 55.9, p Ͻ .0001-but only marginal for misuse of power. The slope coefficient of the linear relationship between group-level HC scores and individual tendencies to help others was also marginal. In general, group-level cultural-orientation scores added little to the prediction of power beliefs over and above individual-level cultural-orientation scores, suggesting that individual cultural orientation partially mediated the between-group differences observed.
Discussion
This study investigated distinct beliefs about the appropriateness of using power for one's own benefit or for that of others, examining participants from cultural groups that differed in terms of their HC and VI cultural orientations. Overall, findings supported the cultural patterning of power representations at multiple levels. As expected, a VI (and not an HI) orientation was associated with endorsing a personalized power concept, including using power for one's own benefit while disregarding others' concerns, and believing in the inequalities of social groups and in the appropriateness of maintaining one's high status by dominating others. At the same time, a VI orientation was uncorrelated with endorsing the use of power to help others.
In contrast, an HC orientation was associated with beliefs about the appropriateness of using power for helping others. An HC (and not a VC) orientation was also negatively correlated with endorsing the use of power without concern for others, with beliefs in the inequalities of social groups, and with willingness to dominate others. That is, as predicted, high-HC individuals reject the use of power for personal gain without considering others' concerns. Although a VC orientation was also associated with endorsing the use of power to help others, this association was weaker than that for HC. As indicated earlier, although people high in VC may associate power with helping others, these associations may be less strong or defined than for people high in HC. Overall, whereas HC and VI showed the anticipated links to socialized and personalized power concepts, respectively, the other orientations (HI and VC) showed little to no relation with the power measures. This supports the value of the horizontal/vertical framework for predicting distinct power concepts. Evidence for the cultural patterning of power concepts was found both at the individual and at the cultural-group levels. Across all cultural groups, a VI orientation predicted higher MOP and SDO scores, whereas an HC orientation predicted higher HPM scores and lower MOP and SDO scores. At the cultural-group level, Hispanic participants were the cultural group with the highest HC and the lowest VI scores. Thus, they exhibited higher HPM scores and lower SDO and MOP scores than did any of the other cultural groups. The multilevel analysis further suggested that individual-level VI and HC scores mediated the between-group differences in power beliefs. When simultaneously controlling for cultural orientation and cultural-group membership, VI (HC) orientation significantly predicted participants' personalized (socialized) view of power.
Study 2: Culture and Vivid Episodic Memory for Exercises of Power
If cultural orientation is linked to specific power goals in memory, then one would expect more vivid recall of events associated with the pursuit of culturally relevant power goals. People who have ongoing concerns with a motivational domain are better at encoding, and subsequently retrieving, goal-related knowledge than are people without these concerns (Woike, McLeod, & Goggin, 2003) , which results in the more vivid recall of experiences that express these ongoing concerns. For instance, Woike (1995) found that people with implicit achievement and intimacy concerns recalled more vividly experiences related to these motivational domains than did people without these concerns. In Study 2, using a procedure similar to Woike and colleagues' to measure emotional memories associated with implicit motivations (Woike, 1995; Woike et al., 2003) , we asked a multicultural sample of participants to recall an experience related to an exercise of either personalized or socialized power. We expected a VI (HC) orientation to predict the relatively vivid recall of personalized (socialized) power experiences.
Method
Participants. People from three cultural groups participated in the study (N ϭ 244). Two groups consisted of students from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign: One included 80 European Americans, and the other, 98 East Asians/Asian Americans (on average, the East Asian students had been in the United States for 6.1 years). The third group consisted of 66 Hispanic participants (79% from Mexico, with an average of 10. 9 years in the United States) from the Minneapolis-St. Paul area. Fifty-four percent of all participants were male. The average age of student participants was 20.8 years, and that of Hispanic participants was 37.1. Students participated for course credit, whereas Hispanic participants were paid $8 each.
Procedure. In groups of 20 -30, and as part of a larger survey about people's opinions about varied topics, products and brands, participants were randomly assigned to either a personalized power (acquiring status) or socialized power (helping others) condition. In the acquiring status condition, participants were asked to remember a situation in which they "had power over others, impressed, influenced, acquired status, or were praised by others" (see Winter, 1973) . In the helping others condition, they were to remember a situation in which they "had the power to help others, gave unsolicited help, assistance, advice, or support to some other person." They were asked to write about their experience, describing it in detail (e.g., who the other person was, what happened, when it happened, what they felt after the situation). Participants were given a letter-sized page and no time limit to complete the task. After an unrelated task, participants completed the culturalorientation scale (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) , answered demographic questions, and were debriefed and dismissed. Students completed the materials in English, whereas Hispanic participants did so in Spanish.
Dependent variables. Written experiences were coded for vividness by two raters who were fluent in the language in which they were written. We adapted the coding of most memorable experiences developed by Woike (1995) and rated the written experiences along a continuum using a 4-point scale ranging from 0 (Routine situation with no details and lack of emotions, or absence of elements associated with the power domain) to 3 (Very detailed and emotionally charged account of the situation in relation to the power domain). Experiences in which one acquired status over others were coded for the vividness of their personalized power themes of being recognized by others as a high-status person (see Winter, 1973) , whereas experiences in which one helped others were coded for the vividness of their socialized power themes of having positive effects on others. If a theme was absent or the experience reflected a routine exercise of power, it was coded as zero (e.g., "I assigned the work to the interns under me" or "I kept the door open for somebody coming after me"). Detailed and emotionally charged experiences related to the power themes were coded as 3 (e.g., "I scored at the top and my teammates were amazed" or "I consoled my roommate and that made me very happy cause I know that helped her a lot"). Agreement between the two raters was high ( ϭ .80) and disagreements were resolved by discussion.
Results and Discussion
Scale reliabilities. For all the samples, reliabilities were satisfactory (see Table 4 ).
Vividness of recall by cultural group. There was no evidence from the debriefing that participants saw a link between their ethnicity and the recall task. We first assessed differences between the cultural groups via separate analyses of variance (ANOVAs) on vividness of recall ratings in each condition, with cultural group as a fixed factor and age as a covariate. Significant differences emerged between groups for the vividness of recall of personalized power experiences, F(2, 223) ϭ 4.67, p Ͻ .01, and socialized power experiences, F(2, 223) ϭ 5.77, p Ͻ .005. The effect of age was not significant in both analyses ( ps Ͼ .15). As shown in Table 4 , Hispanic participants' episodic recall was significantly more (less) vivid for socialized (personalized) power events than that of any of the other cultural groups. Hispanic participants also had higher HC (lower VI) scores than did any of the other cultural groups.
As in Study 1, European Americans and East Asians/Asian Americans did not differ in their cultural-orientation scores or in their vividness of recall. Overall, these findings suggest that between-group differences in episodic memory corresponded to the pattern of their VI and HC cultural orientations, even though some groups' orientation scores did not differ as proposed. Given that cultural group and individual levels of analysis often do not yield isomorphic results (Oyserman et al., 2002) , deeper insights can be gained by simultaneously analyzing the independent effect of cultural orientation and group membership on vividness of recall.
Vividness of recall as a function of cultural orientation and group. To examine the simultaneous effect of individual-and group-level cultural orientation on vividness of event recall, we estimated two compositional multilevel models (one for each type of situation recalled) similar to those in the previous study. Vividness of recall associated with an exercise of either personalized or socialized power was the dependent variable.
Relationships between vividness of recall and cultural orientations. The slope coefficient involving personalized-power recall and VI scores (␥ 20 ) was positive and significant (see Table 5 ). This suggests, as expected, that a VI orientation predicts more vivid recall of experiences in which one acquired status over others. Similarly, the slope coefficient involving socialized-power recall and HC scores (␥ 30 ) was positive and significant, suggesting as expected that an HC orientation predicts more vivid recall of experiences in which one helped others. Consistent with the previous studies, slope coefficients involving HI and VC scores did not reach significance.
Generalizability of power-culture relationships. We assessed the generalizability of the hypothesized relationships between cultural orientation and vividness of recall across cultural groups by analyzing deviations of the group-level slopes from the mean slope (u 2 and u 3 random components). Neither random component was significantly different from zero. These findings support the generalizability of the observed relationships across the cultural groups we studied (see group-level slopes in Table 6 ).
Group-level cultural-orientation scores and vividness of recall. We found no evidence of contextual effects of HC and VI grouplevel scores on individual vividness of recall. As shown in Table  5 , the slope coefficients of the linear relationships between grouplevel VI or HC scores and vividness of recall (␥ 01 ) were positive but insignificant. These findings suggest that, after accounting for individual-level cultural-orientation scores, group-level culturalorientation scores did not add to the prediction of vividness of recall, providing evidence for mediation.
Overall, results in this study further support the notion that power concepts and goals are culturally patterned. One strength of this study is the unobtrusive assessment of power concepts. Rather than collecting self-reports of power beliefs, as in Study 1, we tapped power associations by assessing, through independent ratings, the vividness of emotional memories associated with implicit motivations (see McAdams, 1982; Woike et al., 2003 , for a discussion about the implicit nature of these measures). The results suggest that culturally Table 4 Means
, Standard Deviations, and Reliabilities by Cultural Group for Vividness of Experience Ratings and Cultural-Orientation Scores (Study 2)
Cultural group nurtured concepts of power impact the encoding of experiences in memory and facilitate the accessibility of episodes relevant to personalized or socialized power. When thinking about situations in which one had the power to impress others, a VI orientation was positively related to the vivid recall of such experiences. In contrast, when thinking about situations in which one had the power to change others' outcomes in a positive way, an HC orientation was positively related to the vivid recall of such experiences. Evidence for the cultural patterning of power concepts was supported at both the individual and the cultural-group level. Moreover, cultural orientation mediated the differences in vividness ratings between cultural groups. The next study extended the findings to attitudes congruent with the pursuit of distinct power goals.
Study 3: Culture and Liking for Brands That Symbolize Power Values
Self-relevant goals affect the perceived attractiveness of objects (Feather, 1988 (Feather, , 1992 . Thus, if cultural orientation is associated with alternative goals in the service of distinct power concepts, this should be observed in evaluations of brands that embody values that are consistent with the corresponding power concept. Study 3 tested a broad set of cultural groups to assess whether a VI cultural orientation is generally associated with liking for brands that embody personalized power values of status and prestige, whereas an HC orientation is generally associated with liking for brands that embody concerns for the welfare of others in general (i.e., prosocial values such as social justice, a world at peace, and equality; Schwartz, 1992) .
Method
Participants. A sample of 876 participants on four different continents (North and South America, Europe, and the Middle East region of Asia) participated for course credit. To avoid potential confounds associated with recruiting participants with different backgrounds (e.g., immigrants vs. college students), we selected participants for this study from among undergraduate and graduate students enrolled in various university programs in five countries: European Americans (n ϭ 151) and Asian/Asian Americans (n ϭ 137) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, European Canadians (n ϭ 109) at the University of Manitoba, Norwegians (n ϭ 101) at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Brazilians (n ϭ 111) at several major universities in Sao Paolo, and Turkish students (n ϭ 267) at Koc University. Countries were selected to cover a broad range of cultural orientations (see Triandis, 1995) .
Procedure. In groups of 10 -30, and as part of a longer survey about people's opinions about varied topics, products and brands, participants were asked to think about their favorite brands as individuals that embody certain values and to identify the values that would describe their favorite brands. This was done to elicit the human value content of the brands that participants like. They were then presented with a table containing the target values, interspersed among filler values unrelated to power (excitement, novelty, and challenge in life), and asked to rate the extent to which they liked brands that were described by or symbolize the different values, using a 7-point scale ranging from -3 (dislike a lot) to 3 (like a lot). More specifically, participants rated the extent to which they liked brands that symbolize "Power values, that is social power, authority and wealth"-consistent with a personalized power concept-and the extent to which they liked brands that symbolize "Prosocial values, that is social justice, environmental protection, a world at peace, unity with nature, equality and wisdom"-representing universalism values (Schwartz, 1992) that are consistent with a socialized power concept. After completing some filler tasks, participants completed the 16-item cultural-orientation scale (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) , answered demographic questions, and were debriefed and dismissed. Participants in the United States and Canada completed the materials in English, whereas those in Norway, Brazil, and Turkey did so in their local language.
Results
Scale reliabilities. For all the samples, scale reliabilities were satisfactory (see Table 7 ).
Liking for brands by cultural group. We first assessed differences between the cultural groups via a MANOVA on the liking measures, with cultural group as a fixed factor.
5 There were 5 Because participants in the different samples were similar in age, this variable was dropped from the analyses. Table 7 , Brazilians exhibited significantly higher liking for prosocial brands than did any of the other groups. Brazilians also had higher HC scores than any other cultural group had, consistent with the collectivist orientation of Brazilians emerging in past research (e.g., Hofstede, 1980) . In contrast, Norwegians exhibited lower liking for brands that symbolize personalized power than did any of the other groups. Norwegians, along with Brazilians, had the lowest VI score. This is congruent with past research suggesting that Scandinavian people express little concern with status and power (Nelson & Shavitt, 2002) . Finally, European Americans had relatively high VI scores, consistent with results in past studies (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) . Overall, then, between-group differences in liking for brands that symbolize values consistent with personalized or socialized power concepts largely paralleled the differences associated with VI and HC orientations.
Liking for brands as a function of cultural orientation and group. To examine the simultaneous effect of individual-and group-level cultural-orientation scores, we estimated two separate compositional multilevel models (one for each liking measure). Liking for brands that symbolize personalized power values or prosocial values was predicted by the same regression equation used in previous studies.
6
Relationships between brand evaluation and cultural orientation. As expected, the slope coefficient involving brands that symbolize personalized power values and VI scores (␥ 20 ) was positive and significant (see Table 8 ). In other words, a VI orientation predicted liking for brands associated with personalized power, prestige, and status. Similarly, the slope coefficient involving brands that symbolize prosocial values and HC scores (␥ 30 ) was positive and significant. Thus, an HC orientation predicted liking for brands associated with protecting the welfare of others. There was also a significant negative relationship between VI and liking for brands that embody prosocial values. Although unexpected, this may simply reflect a perception that status brands are rarely associated with prosocial actions (Bendell & Kleanthous, 2007) . Finally, slope coefficients for the relationships between HI and VC scores and the dependent variables were not significant, as expected.
Generalizability of culture-brand evaluation relationships. As before, neither of the random components of the slope coefficients differed significantly from zero. These findings suggest that the observed relations generalized across cultural groups (see group-level slopes in Table 9 ).
Group-level cultural-orientation scores and brand evaluation. As depicted in Table 8 , the slope coefficient of the linear relationship between group-level VI scores and individual liking for brands associated with personalized power values was positive and significant-significantly different from that obtained at the individual level, 2 (2) ϭ 96.3, p Ͻ .0001. This finding suggests that 
Discussion
Study 3 provides further support for the cultural patterning of power concepts, both at the individual and at the cultural-group levels. As expected, a VI orientation predicted liking for brands that symbolize personalized power values of status and prestige, whereas an HC orientation predicted liking for brands that embody concerns for the welfare of others. Moreover, these relations emerged across cultural groups. Brazilians, who exhibited the highest HC scores, liked brands that symbolize prosocial values better than did any of the other groups. Norwegians, who scored among the lowest in VI orientation, liked brands that symbolize personalized power values less than did all the other groups. The multilevel analysis further suggested that people's VI and HC cultural orientations partially mediated group-level differences in liking for such brands.
One potential concern about Study 3 is that participants generated their own set of favorite brands, instead of being given a consistent set of brands to rate. However, using a consistent set of brands that were also equally familiar to participants in the five different countries would have been biased toward global brands likely to have a prestige and status image (Batra, Ramaswamy, Alden, Steenkamp, & Ramachander, 2000) . Allowing participants to generate their own set of favorite brands addressed this issue and also constituted a more conservative test of our hypotheses, given the potential for higher variance being introduced into the data.
However, a limitation of our procedure is that it did not provide data about the distinct brand images that participants brought to mind (e.g., personalized or socialized power-consistent images). We argue that liking ratings should have been driven by the match between accessible brand images in memory and the item descriptions (e.g., "wealth" vs. "social justice"). Results with a separate sample, using a modified procedure, suggest that this is in fact the case. European American and Chinese college student participants (N ϭ 320) were asked to think about their favorite brands, as in Study 3. However, they were also prompted to write down the name of their single most favored brand (e.g., "Apple" and "Nike" for Americans, and "Lining" and "Lenovo" for Chinese) and to rate, on 7-point scales, the extent to which their favorite brand symbolizes values that are consistent with a personalized (e.g., "wealth") or a socialized (e.g., "social justice") power concept. Consistent with results in Study 3, across the two cultural groups, only a VI (HC) orientation predicted having a favorite brand that symbolizes personalized (socialized) power values (␤ ϭ .34 and .32, respectively; p Ͻ .001). In addition, findings congruent with those of Study 3 were obtained when asking multicultural participants to rate hypothetical brands pretested to symbolize values consistent with personalized or socialized power concepts (Torelli, Ozsomer, Carvalho, Keh, & Maehle, 2009 ).
Study 4: Culture and Power Goal-Oriented Responses
The next two studies were designed to extend the findings to a broader array of outcomes related to the contexts and ways in which people use power. Although for these studies we were able to investigate only a smaller set of cultural groups (East Asians and U.S. participants, whose cultural orientations did not reliably differ in prior studies), our focus here was on the role of individual cultural orientation, given its predictive power as evidenced in the prior studies. Study 4 was designed to examine goal-oriented responses of people high in VI or HC in contexts that make salient personalized or socialized power objectives. Ongoing concerns with a motivational domain tend to express themselves through behaviors that promote their attainment (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Torelli & Kaikati, 2009 ) and also to guide the evaluation of people and events (Feather, 1990; Rohan, 2000) . Accordingly, if ongoing power concerns are culturally patterned, one should expect evaluative and behavioral responses that promote the attainment of personalized (socialized) power objectives among people high in VI (HC). In this study, American and Singaporean participants responded to three categories of measures: (1) implicit measures of power-related motivations obtained from a projective test (modified Thematic Apperception Test, or TAT; Sokolowski, Schmalt, Langens, & Puca, 2000) or an impression-formation measure, (2) evaluation of targets engaged in exercises of power in the service of either personalized or socialized power concepts, and (3) behavioral intentions to scenarios instrumental for satisfying either personalized or socialized power goals.
Method
Participants. In this study, 309 students in academic programs at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and at Singapore Management University participated for course credit. Of the participants, 167 (all from the American sample) were of a European American background and 142 were of an East Asian background (45% Singaporean, 35% East Asian from other countries, 20% Asian American).
7 Forty-five percent were male; average age was 20.8 years. East Asian participants in the United States had been living in the country for an average of 5.2 years.
Procedure. In groups of 20 -30, participants first completed the modified TAT (Sokolowski et al., 2000) aimed at measuring ongoing personalized power concerns. After a filler task, they were presented with a series of five scenarios relevant to power goals. Finally, after working on unrelated tasks for approximately 10 min, participants completed the 16-item cultural-orientation scale (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) , answered demographic items, and were debriefed and dismissed.
Stimuli and dependent variables. Implicit personalized power-related motivations were captured with a modified TAT (Sokolowski et al., 2000) . In a TAT (Winter, 1993b) , participants are shown an ambiguous picture and are asked to make up a story about it. The stories are then coded for the presence of power themes. We used a task that combines features of the TAT with features of self-report questionnaires to facilitate the coding of participants' responses (Multi-Motive Grid, or MMG; see Sokolowski et al., 2000) . Participants saw six ambiguous drawings of people in different situations. For each drawing, they described the way people could think and feel in the situation by answering "YES" or "NO" to a set of statements representing emotions, cognitions, goals, and actions instrumental to personalized power (e.g., "Trying to influence other people" and "Hoping to acquire a good standing"). Sokolowski et al. (2000) provided evidence for the reliability and validity of this method to measure power strivings. The personalized power score was the total number of "YES" responses (up to 12) to statements that reflect strivings for personalized power.
Implicit socialized power motivations were captured with an impression-formation task. Participants read about a fictitious powerful executive who successfully influenced a group of colleagues in a business meeting. The executive was described as respected and knowledgeable and as having a firm personality. To the extent that participants were motivated by socialized power concerns, they were expected to perceive an influence attempt by a legitimate source as an exercise of power for the benefit of others (see Bargh & Alvarez, 2001) . To measure such perceptions, participants rated to what extent the executive is a "caring" person on a 6-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 6 (very much). 8 In two other scenarios we measured participants' evaluations of people using power in personalized or socialized terms. Participants read stories about fictitious persons and rated their liking for each one on a 9-point scale ranging from -4 (dislike a lot) to 4 (like a lot), with 0 ϭ neutral. One target was portrayed as somebody very concerned with status and prestige and with little concern for others. Participants with personalized power concerns should report more positive attitudes toward this target (see Winter, 1973) . Another target realizes that a guy next to him at a bus stop is upset and that he can cheer him up by offering unsolicited help. Participants with socialized power concerns should report more positive attitudes toward that target (see Winter, 1973) .
Behavioral intentions to seek or restore personalized or socialized power were measured with two additional scenarios. Participants imagined themselves in each situation and rated the likelihood of engaging in given behaviors along a scale ranging from 1 (very unlikely) to 9 (very likely). First, participants imagined that they were in a public place with some friends and that somebody was staring at them and visibly talking and laughing. Among those with personalized power concerns, this should be viewed as a threat to one's prestige and should lead to behaviors aimed at restoring one's status (see Winter, 1973) , for instance by engaging in forceful actions that signal power and status to others (see McClelland, 1973; Winter, 1973 Winter, , 1993a . To measure this, participants rated the likelihood that they would engage in aggressive verbal behaviors in that situation if necessary.
Participants also imagined that a friend was having academic problems, possibly due to family issues, and that the participant was considering talking to the friend's brother to inquire about these issues with the implicit intention of helping the friend. Among those with socialized power concerns, a person needing help should be seen as an opportunity to have positive effects on others (see Winter, 1973) , for example by actively seeking information instrumental for providing unsolicited help (see McClelland, 1973; Winter, 1973 Winter, , 1993a . To measure this, participants rated the likelihood that 7 Because there were no significant differences between East Asians from the different samples for any of the measures, their data were pooled for analysis to increase the power of the test. Analyses conducted on the different samples separately showed the same patterns of results but weaker effects. 8 Results from a separate pretest (n ϭ 191) using European American and East Asian participants showed that an HC orientation positively predicts perceptions of power holders as possessing traits consistent with the use of power for helping others (e.g., caring).
they would talk to their friend's brother and share with him their concerns.
Results and Discussion
Scale reliabilities. Reliabilities of the cultural-orientation subscales were generally satisfactory for both East Asians and European Americans, respectively (HI, ␣ ϭ .63 and .68; VI, ␣ϭ .71 and .80; HC, ␣ϭ .73 and .70; VC, ␣ ϭ .72 and .75). Because a variety of power-related stimuli and scenarios were used to test the hypothesized relationships, high reliabilities of the power measures were not expected (i.e., higher bandwidth at the expense of lower accuracy of measurement; see Cronbach & Gleser, 1965 ). An exploratory factor analysis on the power-related measures, using maximum likelihood with direct oblimin rotation, showed that the measures loaded as expected on two separate personalized and socialized power factors. Measures of personalized and socialized power showed moderate intercorrelations (␣ ϭ .32 and .33, respectively, for European Americans; ␣ ϭ .37 and .38, respectively, for East Asians). We standardized each measure and computed personalized and socialized power indices by averaging participants' responses to the measures in each power domain (using factor loadings as weights). This was done with the expectation that, although not highly overlapping, the measures in each domain were related to power goal-oriented responses (see , for a discussion).
Goal-oriented responses by cultural group. The power indices were submitted to a repeated-measures ANOVA with cultural group as a between-subjects factor. As was also the case in the prior studies comparing European Americans and East Asians, results yielded no significant effects (all ps Ͼ .45). This is consistent with the similarity in VI and HC scores between the two groups ( p Ͼ .6).
Goal-oriented responses as a function of cultural orientation and group. To simultaneously assess the relationships between cultural group and individual cultural orientation on power goaloriented responding, we conducted two separate regression analyses with the personalized or socialized power index as a dependent variable and the four cultural-orientation scores, the cultural group (dummy-coded), and the interaction between VI and HC scores and the cultural group as predictors (a total of seven predictors in each regression). The analysis on the personalized power index revealed the expected significant coefficient of VI orientation (␤ ϭ .32), t(291) ϭ 4.13, p Ͻ .001, and also a significant negative coefficient for HC orientation (␤ ϭ -.19), t(291) ϭ -2.36, p Ͻ .025. The regression coefficient for cultural group approached significance (␤ ϭ -.10), t(291) ϭ -1.74, p ϭ .082. This latter effect was driven by a higher personalized power score among European Americans compared with East Asians (M ϭ 0.0176 and -0.0308, respectively). No other coefficient reached significance ( ps Ͼ .1). The analysis on the socialized power index revealed only the expected significant coefficient for HC orientation (␤ ϭ .49), t(291) ϭ 6.41, p Ͻ .001. No other coefficient reached significance ( ps Ͼ .24).
These results support the notion that power goal-oriented responses are culturally patterned. A VI orientation was associated with responses that promote the attainment of personalized power goals. In contrast, an HC orientation was positively related with responses that promote the attainment of socialized power objectives and negatively related with responses that promote personalized power goals without concern for others. This latter finding is consistent with our prior arguments and with results in Study 1. The effects emerged strongly for individual cultural orientation and directionally (for personalized power) for cultural group. As expected, there were no relationships between HI and VC orientations and the power measures. Overall, the findings from Study 4 extend those from the previous studies on power beliefs, memories, and evaluations. This study suggests that cultural orientation affects the distinct power motives triggered by ambiguous stimuli, guides the evaluation of targets exercising power, and elicits behavioral intentions oriented toward establishing and protecting power.
Study 5: Cultural Orientation and Behavior Benefiting the Self Versus Others
Study 5 aimed to extend the findings to an unobtrusive measure of behavior. To uncover associations between HC (VI) and tendencies to use power in a benevolent (exploitative) way, we presented participants from two cultures with a negotiation task used in past research on power (Howard et al., 2007) . Participants played the role of a high-powered real-estate developer in a negotiation task with a low-powered contractor. We expected that HC (VI) scores would predict exercising power in the negotiation with less (more) exploitative behaviors.
Method
Participants. In this study, 142 students enrolled at the University of Minnesota (n ϭ 81, 83% European Americans) and at Sun Yat-Sen University in China (n ϭ 61, all Chinese) participated in the study in exchange for course credit (56% male, average age ϭ 25.3 years).
Procedure. Participants were told that they were participating in an online negotiation with another participant. The task was described as a dispute situation between a real-estate developer and the owner of a carpentry business about the amount to pay the contractor after incorporating a higher (and more expensive) grade of wood in a new development that went beyond contractual specifications. The real-estate developer was in a high-power position in the negotiation in that he possessed resources (e.g., money) and had contractual law on his side. The contractor was in a low-power position because he lacked resources and would go out of business if not reimbursed for the extra cost. All participants were assigned to the real-estate developer role and were asked to prepare for entering the amount they would pay the contractor. In preparing for the negotiation, they were told that they would like to pay the contractor $7,000 per unit, whereas the contractor would like to be paid $9,500 per unit. At this stage, the participants were asked, "If you had complete power in this negotiation, what is the most that you would pay the other party?" Participants responded on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 ($7,000) to 7 ($9,500). We expected that VI scores would predict the exploitative exercise of power for one's own gain (i.e., lower payments), whereas HC scores would predict the benevolent exercise of power for others' welfare (i.e., higher payments). Next, participants were told that the negotiation task had ended, and they worked on some unrelated tasks. Finally, participants completed the cultural-orientation scale and demographic items and were debriefed and dismissed. During debriefing, no participants showed any signs of suspicion about the veracity of the negotiation task.
Results and Discussion
Amount to be paid by cultural group. An ANOVA on the highest amount that participants indicated they would pay the contractor, with cultural group as a fixed factor, yielded a main effect of cultural group, F(1, 140) ϭ 14.06, p Ͻ .001. American participants indicated a lower amount than Chinese participants did (M ϭ $7,769.14 and $8,138.03, respectively) . Because Chinese participants did not differ from American participants in their VI scores (M ϭ 4.64 and 4.79, respectively, p ϭ .41) or HC scores (M ϭ 5.53 and 5.54, respectively), we could not test whether cultural orientation mediates the effects of cultural group on amount to be paid.
Amount to be paid as a function of cultural orientation and group. The highest amount that participants would pay the contractor was used as the dependent variable in a regression analysis similar to that used in Study 4. As expected, VI orientation negatively predicted the amount to be paid to the contractor (␤ ϭ -.44), t(134) ϭ -3.82, p Ͻ .001, whereas HC orientation positively predicted the amount to be paid (␤ ϭ .30), t(134) ϭ 2.30, p Ͻ .025. The coefficient for the cultural group was also significant (␤ ϭ -.31), t(134) ϭ -3.70, p Ͻ .001, in line with the ANOVA results. No other coefficient reached significance ( ps Ͼ .17). Participants high (vs. low) in HC were willing to pay more to the contractor, presumably driven by their concern for this person's welfare. In contrast, participants high (vs. low) in VI were willing to pay less, presumably driven by their concern for their personal gain. As expected, there were no relations between HI and VC orientations and the amount to be paid to the contractor. This reinforces the notion of distinct power concepts uniquely associated with VI and HC cultural orientations.
In line with this, in a separate study (N ϭ 58), we replicated the association between HC and tendencies to use power in a benevolent way with actual charitable donations. Participants were given the opportunity to donate money to a charitable program that emphasized helping an outgroup (refugees from Africa) to acquire the basic skills that would improve their daily lives. Results showed that an HC (VI) orientation predicted donating a higher (lower) amount of money to the program. As before, the other cultural orientations were not predictive of this behavior.
General Discussion
Culture influences attitudes and beliefs about what is desirable and meaningful in order to guide instrumental actions (Triandis, 1996) . Because power is instrumental for achieving culturally desirable goals, cultures should foster normative standards for its legitimate use (Chiu & Hong, 2006) . Surprisingly, however, cultural frameworks have had little to say about how culture nurtures goals, attitudes, and beliefs about the meaning and purpose of power. This research fills this gap in the literature by linking the distinction in the study of culture between vertical and horizontal versions of individualism and collectivism to the nurturing of alternative power concepts. Taken together, five studies showed that a vertical individualist (and not a horizontal individualist) cultural orientation is linked to conceptualizing power as something to be used for advancing one's personal agenda and hence maintaining and promoting one's powerful status. In contrast, a horizontal collectivist (and not a vertical collectivist) cultural orientation is linked to conceptualizing power as something to be used for benefiting others.
Evidence for a culturally patterned view of power was provided by investigating beliefs about appropriate uses of power (Study 1), episodic memories about power (Study 2), attitudes in the service of power goals (Studies 3 and 4) , and the contexts and ways in which power is used (Studies 4 and 5; see Table 10 for a summary of findings). By covering a wide range of psychological domains known to be patterned by culture (e.g., beliefs, attitudes, and goals; Triandis, 1996) , we provide empirical evidence for culturally nurtured differences in power concepts. The wide array of measures used in this research also argues against potential method biases, because some of the measures were self-reported (Studies 1, 3, and 4), whereas others were more implicit (Studies 2 and 4) or more behavioral (Studies 4 and 5). Furthermore, empirical evidence for a culturally patterned view of power was found using samples of participants from cultures on four continents (North and South America, Europe, and Asia), attesting to the generalizability of the observed relationships and was observed both at the individual level and the group level of analysis. Across the five studies, and among the nine different cultural groups studied, VI and HC (and not HI and VC) cultural orientations were consistently associated with personalized and socialized power concepts, respectively. Analogous results emerged at the cultural-group level in the studies that included groups that differed significantly on VI and HC orientations (Studies 1-3). Furthermore, in these studies, VI and HC cultural orientation mediated the relationship between cultural group and power concepts. This underscores both the cultural significance of the findings and the value of studying a broader set of cultures.
European Americans and East Asians in our samples rarely differed significantly in VI and HC scores. Although this is not a rare event in the literature (e.g., Benet-Martinez & KarakitapogluAygun, 2003) , the lack of differences may also be attributed to the testing of East Asian participants in English (Trafimow et al., 1997) . For these two cultural groups, the effects were generally stronger at the level of measured cultural orientation than at the group level. As Oyserman et al. (2002) demonstrated, cultural group does not necessarily predict endorsement of individualism/ collectivism values. Triandis and Gelfand (1998) argued that all four cultural orientations will be present in any culture, and for any individual, constraints in the society and in the context will determine what cultural aspects of the self will be sampled. It is important to keep in mind that individual and group differences in cultural values need not operate in the same way to influence power associations (see Lalwani et al., 2009) . Indeed, expecting that group-level and individual-level cultural effects will be isomorphic risks committing the ecological fallacy (e.g., Bond, 2002; Smith, 2004) . Our findings shed light on culture/power associations at each level of analysis.
By linking the cross-cultural domain with the burgeoning interest in power, we contribute to the study of culture by elucidating the sociocognitive and behavioral correlates of vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism. This is particularly important given that the meaning and nomological networks of these orientations are little understood, despite the fact that many crosscultural studies rely on these constructs to explain cultural effects (e.g., Kurman & Sriram, 2002; Yang, van de Vliert, & Shi, 2007) . Moreover, we contribute to the study of power by demonstrating for the first time the cultural antecedents of distinct power concepts.
Implications for Cross-Cultural Models
Although the importance of the individualism/collectivism distinction in cross-cultural research in psychology is indisputable, a more refined definition that isolates the core elements of individualism and collectivism is key to understanding the ways in which these constructs influence basic psychological processes (see Brewer & Chen, 2007; also Oyserman et al., 2002) . Our findings shed light on this issue and point to the usefulness of the vertical/ horizontal distinction in further delineating the broad individualism/collectivism constructs.
Current theorizing has focused on the role of competition in characterizing vertical individualists (e.g., as captured by items such as "competition is the law of nature"; Triandis & Gelfand, 1998) . Our findings suggest that the understanding of VI may be advanced by expanding our definition beyond competition to encompass the different facets of personalized power, particularly the notion of power as status (see Triandis & Gelfand, 1998 , for a similar suggestion). Although vertical individualists may be concerned with competing and winning out over others, they may do so mainly to achieve the status and recognition that satisfies their personalized power goals. The use of status symbols may fulfill the same goals. On the other hand, the core elements of individualism identified by Oyserman et al. (2002) , independence and uniqueness, may better describe horizontal individualism. As shown in Table 10 , there was no relationship between HI and power measures. The lack of evidence for power concerns among people high in HI points to a key factor that distinguishes them from those high in VI.
Current theorizing has defined horizontal collectivism in terms of interdependence and sociability. Our findings suggest that understanding HC requires acknowledging its multiple associations with power. Individuals high in HC may associate power with prosocial goals of helping others and also oppose the use of personalized power without concern for others (see Winter, 1973 , for a similar discussion about individuals high in fear of power), and they may therefore have ambivalent feelings toward exercises of power. Thus, they do not submit easily to authority (Triandis, 1995) , and they oppose social inequalities (see Strunk & Chang, 1999 , and Study 1 in this research).
Although our findings do not speak directly to the power concerns of vertical collectivists, we suggested earlier that vertical collectivists could see an exercise of either personalized or socialized power positively depending on their role in the social hierarchy and the target of the power attempt. High-status vertical collectivists may share with vertical individualists a concern with personalized power in relation to outgroups, yet they may have prosocial concerns toward ingroups of a lower status. Indeed, the emphasis on duties and obligations toward lower status ingroup members and filial piety toward higher status ingroup members, which previous research has linked to collectivism (Oyserman et al., 2002) , may specifically describe VC rather than collectivism more broadly. The possibility of context specificity and duality in the power concepts of people high in VC seems a fruitful area for future research. The process leading to the development of self-centered or benevolent power concepts may unfold through sociocultural mechanisms such as the collective construction of situational meanings (Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997) . Although we did not set out to investigate this process in the present studies, it stands to reason that cultural notions such as power concepts are collectively defined and subjectively experienced in a way that fits the priorities of the culture. In this manner, culturally shared definitions of many everyday situations should emerge that draw upon common frames of reference regarding power. VI (HC) cultures and their members may come to share an understanding of these situations as affording the pursuit of personalized (socialized) power goals. Future research could investigate such a process by examining whether exemplars from similar categories (e.g., power figures) are perceived differently across cultures in terms of possessing personalized or socialized powerrelated traits (e.g., selfish vs. caring) or whether similar power situations (e.g., interviewing candidates for a job) are defined as affording the pursuit of different power-related goals. This method would support the compelling cultural theory put forward by Kitayama and colleagues (Kitayama et al., 1997; Markus & Kitayama, 1998) .
The findings also need to be considered in light of growing evidence that bicultural individuals can readily switch between cultural mental frames in response to their context (Hong, BenetMartinez, Chiu, & Morris, 2003; Hong, Morris, Chiu, & BenetMartinez, 2000) . Our results suggest that Hispanic participants hold a more benevolent view of power. However, testing these individuals in Spanish may have made their collectivist identity more salient. In other words, the effects of power on bicultural persons may be affected by the cultural frame that is salient in a particular context. This is an important area for future research.
One limitation of this research is that we explored only the culture/power link as reflected in people's self-definitions and their responses to power stimuli. Absent from this analysis is the study of how cultural products (e.g., advertisements and brands) and practices (e.g., customs and traditions) reflect distinct power concepts. For instance, distinct power concepts may be reflected in consumer brands that carry cultural meanings (Aaker, BenetMartinez, & Garolera, 2001 ). This notion finds support in recent research about the cultural symbolism of brands-the degree to which members of a cultural group agree that a brand symbolizes abstract characteristics, such as values, that can signal group identity (Torelli, Chiu, Keh, & Amaral, 2009; ). measured the cultural symbolism of a variety of brands in the United States (a VI culture) and Venezuela (a more collectivist culture). They found that brands that are high (vs. low) in cultural symbolism are distinctively associated with abstract cultural characteristics. For instance, culturally symbolic brands in the United States (e.g., Nike or Ford) embody personalized power values, whereas culturally symbolic brands in Venezuela (e.g., Pan or Mavesa) embody benevolence values (Schwartz, 1992) that are consistent with a socialized power concept. Further investigation of how cultural products embody distinct power concepts seems a worthwhile area for research.
Although we used a broad array of measures to investigate the culture/power link, further insights might have been obtained using techniques to investigate implicit cognitions (e.g., Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) or implicit interpersonal goals (e.g., Chartrand, Fitzsimons, & Fitzsimons, 2008) . These techniques may be particularly useful for examining the contextualized conceptualizations of power posited to exist for high-VC individuals. This awaits further research.
Implications for Models of Power Relations
This research also contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of the "benevolent" side of power (e.g., Chen et al., 2001; Howard et al., 2007) and of its cultural antecedents. Findings in this research uncover differences in culturally nurtured uses of power and more directly associate a benevolent view of power with a horizontal collectivist cultural orientation. This is manifested in beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral intentions aimed at having positive effects on others. This benevolent view of power contrasts with a personalized view of power to promote one's own status and prestige or to control others, as commonly conceptualized in past research (Davidov et al., 2008; S. T. Fiske, 1993; Hofstede, 1980; Schwartz, 1992) . However, both theoretical and empirical evidence argue for considering the benevolent side of power (Howard et al., 2007; McClelland, 1973; McClelland & Wilsnack, 1972; Winter, 1973) . Our findings further support this view and suggest that culturally nurtured views of power can drive how power is used. We do not imply that all prosocial behaviors need to be interpreted as expressions of socialized power, but we underscore the notion that some people may use power in benevolent ways (see Frieze & Boneva, 2001 , for a discussion) and that cultural variables can predict this tendency. Moreover, it appears from our data that high-HC individuals tend not only to conceptualize power in socialized terms but also to have negative reactions toward, and beliefs about the inappropriateness of, using power for personal gain without concern for others. In contrast, people with a personalized view of power seem not to consider helping others as a meaningful purpose of power. The culturally nurtured differences in power concepts uncovered here would qualify some of the downstream consequences of having power that have been documented in past research (e.g., S. T. Fiske, 1993; Kipnis, 1976; Rucker & Galinsky, 2008) .
Power and stereotyping. Overall, our results suggest that, when power is made salient (e.g., when having control over others' outcomes), people high in VI may activate status-enhancing goals, whereas those high in HC may activate prosocial goals of helping others. Activation of these alternative goals should have distinct cognitive consequences. Work by Fiske and colleagues has suggested that having power to control others' outcomes leads to the use of effortless impression-formation strategies (S. T. Fiske, 1993 Fiske, , 2001 Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 2000; Goodwin et al., 1998) . Power holders frequently use stereotypes for their judgments and do not attend to individuating information. Fiske and colleagues argued that these cognitive predilections are driven by a focus on self-centered goals that save time and energy and by a desire to protect beliefs about who should have control in order to defend existing power identities (see also Snyder & Kiviniemi, 2001) . Our findings suggest that high-VI (but not high-HC) people may be the ones likely to engage in such stereotyping processes.
Bases of power. French and Raven (1959) identified multiple bases of social power. They argued that the source of A's power over B is the relationships between A and B from which power is derived. According to French and Raven, these are (a) reward power, or B's perception that A has the ability to mediate rewards for B; (b) coercive power, or B's perception that A has the ability to mediate punishments for B; (c) legitimate power, or B's perception that A has a legitimate right to prescribe behavior for B; (d) referent power, or B's identification with A; and (e) expert power, or B's perception that A has special knowledge or expertise.
As suggested by our research, culture is associated with variations in the bases of power. Cross-cultural research describing how positions in a social hierarchy are obtained (Smith, Dugan, & Trompenaars, 1996; Trompenaars, 1994) emphasizes that individualists gain status through competing with (and outperforming) others, whereas for collectivists their position in the social hierarchy is more a consequence of who they are (e.g., the Indian caste system; Smith et al., 1996) . We speculate that the tendency of individualists to focus upon interactions with strangers (Oyserman et al., 2002) and to view relationships in terms of exchange (Triandis, 1995) should make them more likely to value symbols designed to convey status to a broad, undifferentiated audience (i.e., prestige, possessions, and wealth; Hofstede, 2001; Winter, 1973 Winter, , 1988 in order to exercise expert and reward power. By comparison, the tendency of collectivists to prefer interactions with ingroup members (Hofstede, 1980; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Oyserman et al., 2002) should make them more likely to value symbols that convey ascribed positions in a hierarchy and concern for others' needs (e.g., symbols of traditional authority and of paternalistic leaders; Hofstede, 2001; Wade-Benzoni et al., 2002) in order to exercise legitimate and referent power. These possibilities await further exploration.
Conclusions
Cultures nurture different views of what is desirable and meaningful to do with power. Our findings highlight the value of considering self-centered and benevolent conceptualizations of power as important elements of culture. By building upon the vertical/horizontal distinction nested within the broader individualism/collectivism classification, we demonstrate that culture predicts distinct power concepts. Specifically, vertical individualism is associated with a personalized power concept (power is for status and personal advancement); horizontal collectivism is associated with a socialized power concept (power is for benefiting and helping others). These associations with power were evidenced in the way people perceived, remembered, evaluated, and responded to power-related stimuli. Our findings advance existing models of power relations by identifying a key role for cultural variables. In addition, this research advances understanding of culture by highlighting sociocognitive and behavioral correlates of vertical and horizontal individualism and collectivism as they relate to power.
